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I think many if not most of us see the global nuclear situation in terms similar to those described here.
However, Vijai draws the *opposite* conclusions as to what actions should be taken in response to that emerging strategic situation to those which most of us would draw. I believe that this should be essential reading.

-John Hallam

NATIONAL SECURITY APPROACH PAPER ONE OF 2004

THE EMERGING NUCLEAR WEAPON DYNAMIC & THE MANAGEMENT COMPLEXITIES OF INDIA'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

By Brigadier Vijai K Nair

The global nuclear weapon environment is in a state of flux bringing with it new complexities in the global security ambiance. It is no longer enough to have demonstrated a nuclear-weapons potential by the tests India conducted in May 1998. The elements of deterrence are undergoing changes that have a bearing on the credibility of the nuclear deterrent New Delhi claims it has created. The National Command Authority has to put into place a 'credible deterrence' that has flexible structures and systems to meet the demands of the emerging nuclear weapon environment.

The Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohammed ElBaradei, told the French newspaper Le Monde, "some 35 to 40 countries could produce nuclear weapons "in just a few months," posing a severe challenge to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. While the effects of new entrants will have to be factored into the larger global nuclear matrix the current debilities are many and varied thus compounding the difficulties of nuclear strategy management.

The comprehensive test ban treaty [CTBT] has failed to acquire the minimum pre-requisites to enter into force. Two major players - the US and China - have not even ratified the CTBT while two other nuclear weapon states [NWS] - India and Pakistan - have chosen not to be party to the Treaty. From the time the CTBT was signed in New York with much fanfare the US, China and Russia have carried out numerous subterranean nuclear tests in the guise of 'sub-critical' tests. However, as these were not monitored by an independent verification agency there is no way by which the world may know whether these were actually 'sub-critical' tests and not nuclear tests de-coupled to generate seismic signatures below I KT. Added to this the US, in anticipation of its development and production of new nuclear warheads has initiated a programme to reduce the lead time to conduct nuclear tests by refurbishing structures and systems at the Nevada Test Site. Requisite resources were allocated in the Defence Bill for 2004 for this purpose and the development of new warheads signaling that the programme is well underway.

The fissile material control treaty [FMCT] remains a pipe dream while the proliferation of technological and material means of fissile materials continues unabated. And this at a time when a number of countries are allegedly involved in transferring fissile material enrichment technologies to other states. Undeclared inventories in both Russia and the US are prone to leakages that have resulted in the growth of the 'dirty bomb' phenomenon currently bedeviling the world. The US itself has 1300 reported instances of fissile materials having gone 'walk about'. Media reports suggest that the situation in Russia is far worse.

The US has sounded the death knell of the Non Proliferation Treaty [NPT] by declaring its intent to use military means, including nuclear weapons, to dissuade non nuclear weapon states [NNWS] party to the NPT, it suspects of developing nuclear capabilities. Its pre-emptive strategy based on the counter-proliferation tools developed in the last decade of the 20th century makes nonsense of the commitment by the NNWS to abstain from developing their own nuclear weapon shield. Revocation of the US Furse-Sprat amendment to the 1994 Defense Authorization Act signed by President Bush lifts a decade-old ban on research into low-yield nuclear weapons and authorizes $15 million for continued research into a powerful nuclear weapon capable of destroying deep underground bunkers.

Future new designs centered on low-yield weapons in the five kilotons or below range make these inherently more dangerous because they are more likely to be used. This is in breach of the commitment made by the NWS under Article VI of the NPT. It would be safe to assume this US initiative would re-open the no holds barred nuclear weapons arms race that appeared to have subsided at the end of the Cold War. Democrat Representative, Ellen Tauscher, opines, "the US is spurring a new global arms race with our own development of a new generation of nuclear weapons". Warheads 'designed to generate high intensity shock waves to destroy deep bunkers' such as the ones encountered in Afghanistan that were immune to anything in the US arsenal.

There are, however, signs that the US strategy is not limited to developing 'mini nukes' as reported in the media. According to one report the US military, besides the B-61 nuclear bomb, intends to convert the two megaton B-83 warhead for the same role. If this report has substance the limited enhancement of nuclear capability vis-à-vis development of mini-nukes is only a part of a larger strategy to expand the scope and potential of nuclear weapon strategy.

These are extremely provocative policies, which are drawing a response - not only from other NWS but also with an extended ripple effect on the security perceptions of hitherto non-nuclear weapon states.

China's concerns for the efficacy of its nuclear deterrence in an environment of ballistic missile defences [BMD] has propelled its nuclear modernisation programme including research and development in the realm of satellite kill capabilities. The latter concept threatens not only to degrade the potential of the ballistic missile defenses that the US is developing, but also the accuracies of the existing nuclear weapon systems on which US deterrence is based. The Chinese nuclear establishment is known to have miniaturised its warheads and has the potential to deploy MIRVs that would greatly enhance its ability to saturate an American NMD. Besides a long list of areas in which it is modernizing its strategic forces, China has accelerated its space programme with the intent to deploy an independent space station. The latter would give it the potential for a viable satellite kill capability in the future, if required.

According to the latest edition of its annual report to Congress on Chinese military capabilities, just released by the Department of Defense, the Pentagon is concerned by Beijing's growing ballistic missile capabilities, and the implications of the PRC's strategic arsenal on the balance of power in Asia. China continues investments in medium- and long-range ballistic missile capabilities. According to the study, "missile force modernization and training developments in recent years highlight China's continuing effort to improve quantitatively and qualitatively the capabilities of its conventionally armed SRBM force" and "[p]recision-strike capabilities, denial and deception, improved command, control and communications, as well as an increased variety of conventional warheads will remain the emphasis for Chinese conventional missile forces in the next decade." These moves, the report states, have been accelerated by recent Taiwan toward a defensive anti-missile capability (such as the island nation's recent referendum on missile defense), which have led to greater Chinese investments in preparing for "military contingencies in the Taiwan Strait."

The report also emphasizes China's hostility to American missile defense plans, which policymakers in Beijing view as a tool for Washington to contain their country's growing power and prevent a shift in the strategic balance in Asia. "Beijing assesses US efforts to develop missile defenses will challenge the credibility of China's nuclear deterrent and eventually be extended to protect Taiwan," the strategic study says. "China's leaders are likely to believe that missile defense coverage of Taiwan would degrade the coercive value of the PLA's growing conventional theater ballistic missile capability opposite the island."

Russia continues to upgrade its nuclear weapons capabilities and in no uncertain terms President Putin has declared the intent to transform Russian strategy and weapon capabilities in keeping with US formulations for new nuclear warheads and pre-emptive use of these to enhance deterrence/dissuasion. The Deputy Chief of staff of the Russian General Staff, Colonel General Yuri Baluyevsky, told reporters, "We are witnessing that nuclear weapons, which have served as a political deterrent, are being transformed into a battlefield instrument, Š it's very scary, extremely scary."

"That causes us concern," Baluyevsky said. "Should we somehow review our nuclear strategy? Yes, I believe we should." While he refrained from disclosing the possible development of new nuclear weapons, he said, that Russia would retain its stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons. Especially with the expansion of NATO Eastwards and the US and UK persisting with their deployment of similar weapons in Europe.

According to a recent report in the Liberation Newspaper "President Jacques Chirac is planning to revamp France's nuclear strategy," which would comprise of adjusting the French strategic doctrine for the 21st century that was articulated in June 2001. Hard on the heels of this report the French Defence Minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, proclaimed that nuclear arms are "our ultimate protection." Why is there a need for top echelons of the French political leadership to reiterate France's dependence on the Force d' Frappe now, if not to make grounds for a revamp of its nuclear strategy?

Britain, a state that has also declared its right to pre-emptive strikes, is in the process of acquiring and deploying sub-strategic nuclear capabilities on board its Trident fleet.
Besides these there are signs of substantial stirrings in the nuclear philosophies amongst states not party to the NPT.

Reports have surfaced suggesting that: Pakistan is central to alleged horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapon technology amongst Muslim states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya; Israel is allegedly putting into place a viable sea based nuclear weapon force; and, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea [DPRK] having set a precedence of withdrawing from the NPT professes to have developed and deployed nuclear weapons

Finally, the changing nature of nuclear weapon capabilities in East Asia, have given rise to nuclear stirrings amongst the Japanese political and strategic elites. For some time now a heated debate has being going on in Japan on whether or not there is a need to change the constitution to enhance the use of its military. According to a recent poll nearly 20 percent of Japan's lower house of parliament believe that Tokyo should consider becoming a nuclear weapons state [NWS] if international developments push the country in that direction.

Then what about South Korea and Taiwan - both of whom had fairly advanced nuclear weapon programmes in the 1980s?

It is in this context that the Indian nuclear strategy needs to be continually reviewed. While formulating and managing nuclear doctrines and strategy to meet existing challenges the NCA needs to look carefully at where nuclear strategies are proceeding to. Development of hardware and strategic concepts to meet changing strategic imperatives is constrained by an unavoidable lead-time. Research and development of structures and systems to meet future challenges must therefore go on concurrently with the production and management of strategic assets required to stabilize the present strategic environment.

This constraint has to be factored into India's strategic equations of the day without compromising an ability to moderate strategies to meet future challenges. This generates a contradiction that requires to be handled with considerable dexterity and political acumen. Therefore, while strategic dialogues with significant powers is a pre-requisite to maintaining a stable security environment, the NCA has to be careful not to make commitments that may constrain its ability to secure the national security interests in the future. Commitments can only be made today on condition that the NCA has read the pattern of the evolving security environment and understands the conditions of change thereby building in appropriate terms of references into the ongoing strategic dialogues necessary to retain political freedom to moderate strategic capabilities in the future.

In so far as the ongoing strategic developments are concerned it is assumed that the NCA has briefed the Stratcom on the specific threat that it requires the strategic forces to deter or to establish appropriate defensive measures [for detailed analysis of threat given in Defence Technology Issues December 2002 and January 2003].

Simplistically put, in so far as deterrence is concerned the NCA needs to quantify what the political leadership has determined would deter each specific entity. Based on this deterrence analysis the Commander Stratcom must then carry out a detailed target analysis of the options available to include specific targets to meet deterrence imperatives, warhead yield to punishment ratio, suitability of delivery systems that would meet range and penetration imperatives and a long list of technical details that need to be cleared by the NCA for production and deployment or research and development if necessary. Having been provided the target analysis the NCA would then be competent to take a decision on the most suitable option for the weapons capability that it has to put into place and the structures and systems to manage the strategy holistically. It would also dictate the Indian position on arms control strategies affected by the need to validate weapon capabilities, militarisation of outer space, securing fissile material stockpiles and so on

This analysis would then need to be juxtaposed with the analysis of the changing threat vis-à-vis the evolving strategic environment to arrive at an appropriate mid-course correction to the prevailing nuclear strategy.
The simplistic nature of the environment when India exercised its right to field a strategic deterrent force has changed substantially and promises to continue to do so. The National Command Authority [NCA] and the Strategic Command [Stratcom] must, besides creating and managing the basic structures and systems for the management of the nuclear strategy, be sensitive to the larger nuclear matrix and ensure that appropriate modifications to doctrine, structures and systems keep pace with the global strategic dynamic. Failing this the entire exercise of having deployed the 'nuclear option' would become redundant.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: RESPONSE BY VIJAI K NAIR

Question - 1 - The Indo-Pak talk is taking good shape with both the countries showing positive signs. Do you think was the approach towards the whole process taking into consideration all the previous unsuccessful talks the two nations have had in the past?

The Indo-Pak equation is the consequence of specific historic, cultural and geographic circumstances that were aggravated by the geopolitical designs of Western civilizations that have for centuries aspired to control the resources of the region. The resultant geo-strategic blend does not have an equivalent in any other part of the world and is not prone to a resolution through externally generated solutions. Each of these four factors generate countervailing pulls and pushes that aggravate rather than lessen the friction between the two countries.

On the surface of things the ongoing Indo-Pak peace dialogue makes for good media and seminar material. But the question than arises is - is it going anywhere positive? I for one have some serious reservations. Both the countries have diametrically opposite objectives with specially designed strategies to achieve their ends. The present dialogue is centred a round stated objectives and based on extant strategies - nothing there has changed.

India views Kashmir as a part of its territorial whole and will not surrender such territory to another state just because it says so. To do so is to put into question the very foundation of its national being that can be challenged by other constituents of the Republic.

Pakistan on its part works on a philosophy of equivalence and Kashmir is only the first stage of its larger strategy to cut India down to size. This was stated by none other than President Pervez Musharraf at a gathering he addressed in Karachi after having acquired Pakistan through a coup-de-tat. He told the people of Pakistan that even after Kashmir is wrested from India the conflict between the two would continue till India was decimated. Obviously J&K is not the disputed factor but is the first stage of the Indo-Pak confrontation engineered by successive military regimes in Islamabad

Insofar as the current talks are concerned, Pakistan professes that the resolution of the Kashmir issue is the corner stone of the peace process with India. And for that Islamabad has floated options that require India reorganise the territories of Kashmir based on communal partitions. This proposal goes against the very grain of the Indian Constitution that is based on the concept of secularism. I do not see Delhi abrogating its Constitution to accommodate an external power.

Till such time that Islamabad does not recognize that Jammu & Kashmir is an integral part of India which precludes interference from any external power - Pakistan or its mentors - there is little scope for resolving the Indo-Pak confrontation.

A pre-requisite to making any meaningful progress in the Indo-Pak confrontation is a need for New Delhi to make it clear that the West in General and the US in particular has no role to play in internal matters of governance of the Indian Union. Their propensity to regime changes and territorial realignments - such as is being manifested in Ukraine - to propagate their own national interests, will not be accepted. Only then will it be possible to take steps to address the indigenous factors in South Asia that are the cause of the Indo-Pak friction.

Yet another issue that needs to be addressed is Pakistan's track record of one regime signing agreements, such as the 1972 Shimla Agreement and the 1999 Lahore Agreement, only to be trashed by the next [military] regime.

Even if a peace accord does materialize from the ongoing dialogue, what guarantee is there that Islamabad will not relegate it to the dustbin once their immediate goal is achieved?

Question - 10 - According to media reports "The Pakistani supremo has come up with a new formula for Kashmir in which he talking about demilitarizing some parts of J&K and granting them independence or keeping them under joint control or placing them under UN mandate".

Sir what is your opinion on this statement.

Pervez Musharraf's formula - suggesting demilitarization of some parts of Kashmir and granting them Independence or, keeping them under joint control, or placing them under UN Mandate, needs to be viewed in the context of my response to the earlier Question.

Either the General is living in a world of make believe or his megalomaniac belief in that any utterance that passes his lips is indisputable has made him lose contact with existing realities. To start with the territory of J&K is not in dispute but is an integral part of India as legislated by the instruments of accession - territory that Pakistan has coveted from the time of its Independence. In his formula he suggests the opposite. India cannot accept this stratagem as it puts into question the very concept on which the two countries emerged after British rule. As the President of Pakistan, Musharraf's attempt is to give himself the right to dictate terms to India on how it deals with its subjects and territories. Any engagement of this argument by New Delhi will be tantamount to setting a precedence that would threaten the very foundation of the Indian Union. Rightly so the Indian Government has ignored this preposterous suggestion by the General. Prime Minister Azziz Shaukat, recognizing the futility of this stratagem has not introduced it formally in the ongoing dialogue.

Question - 2 - Sir do you think that it will be possible to provide conventional confidence building measures or nuclear security without actually resolving the Kashmir issue.?

Yes it is possible to put suitable Confidence Building Measures [CBMs] into place to stabilize future relations between the two countries. For example: an inviolable and verifiable arrangement to respect the sanctity of the Loc could facilitate a substantial reduction of troops from the forward areas where both sides are in an unstable eye-ball to eye-ball stand off; and, if Pakistan were to undertake to disengage from the 'Proxy War' in J&K, then residual law and order contingencies could be managed by the police, and military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations could be withdrawn to their peace time locations thereby further reducing scope for conflict. These and many others combined with appropriate measures by the State Government could normalize the law and order situation in J&K thereby creating a conducive environment for cross border trade and cultural exchanges amongst the people on both sides of the Loc. Not only would these arrangements allow for force reductions in J&K but would facilitate reducing over all force levels by a factor of raisings that were induced by the need to fight a 'Proxy War' in J&K.

The problem really lies in Pakistan's India centric strategy without Islamabad recognizing that while India has security concerns on its Western border with Pakistan, its security policy extends beyond that limited framework to cater for its security needs along its Northern and Eastern periphery to include its 'extended security horizons'. Therefore the latter has to create and field means [military and non-military] to cope with these multifarious national security imperatives. Islamabad, however, views military CBMs in its own larger strategic frame - i.e. of equivalence. It expects Delhi to drastically reduce force levels to those fielded by Pakistan. This is a non-workable equation, which tends to negate progress in establishing CBMs.

CBMs effecting nuclear security are a different kettle of fish. Provided both countries accept that their strategic capability is designed for the sole purpose of deterring the other - and any supplementary threat - from initiating a nuclear strike against it, then their doctrines will automatically allow for putting in place suitable CBMs to enhance regional stability. However that is not the case. Pakistan's nuclear philosophy extends far beyond. Its strategic forces are designed for war-fighting and authority is delegated to field commanders so that they can use nuclear weapons even if a nuclear attack is not initiated. Under these circumstances, other than a 'no first use' assurance India cannot offer any other CBMs without jeopardizing its national security. However, the only workable solution is to generate sufficient 'confidence' in the minds of the Pakistani political and military leadership that the Indian strategic forces are robust with an assured response that will not be restricted to "proportional responses" vis-à-vis the Pakistani strike. Kashmir does not figure as a consideration in India's nuclear strategic philosophy. It is just the raison d' etre for Pakistan to wage a 'proxy War' - one, which could snow-ball into a full-fledged war.

Question - 3 - How will you compare the Kashmir conflict with the conflicts in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and the Israeli- Palestine conflict?

The only area of commonality in the Kashmir conflict with those pertaining in Sri Lanka and Ireland is that all have their roots in a section of disgruntled people who have serious differences with the policies of the constitutionally elected Government and that this disgruntlement has been fueled by their frustration to achieve their goals leading to resort to arms. Beyond this each conflict has developed along lines dictated by their specific needs and environment. The Kashmir insurgency differs greatly in that it provided Pakistan the opportunity to try and achieve its goal to wrest J&K from India. As it could not stand up to a war with India it resorted to provision of political, diplomatic, financial and military assistance to the disgruntled groups in J&K, which has evolved into a 'Proxy War' wherein arms, personnel and training facilities have been made available to separatist groups. The Kashmir problem is now a 'State Sponsored' war that gets Pakistan off the hook from a direct military confrontation. This is not the case in either Ireland or Sri Lanka.

Question - 4 - The people in Manipur are demanding for the withdrawal of AFSPA from the state. The state is in turmoil after the sensational Manorama murder case. What adverse effects will it have on the security of the state?(If AFSPA is lifted from the state)

To start with I am not sure whether the movement in Manipur for the withdrawal of the AFSPA is a voluntary 'peoples movement' or whether the insurgents have terrorized the people into this initiative. However, the terrain, weapons and tactics of the insurgents preclude normal state responses with their civil police forces and requires combat at levels that only the military is suited for, therefore, the deployment of military and para-military forces. Within the Indian Constitution the military can only act in 'Aid to Civil' authority, which constrains its utilization to the levels and methods of constituted state law and order forces. That in itself is self defeating and instead the State could be expected to raise more police units that still do not have the wherewithal and skills to fight insurgents in the Jungles

As the fighting techniques and legal procedures of arrest etc. can be legally interpreted to lie outside constituted laws, military deployment in counterinsurgency operations needs to be covered by additional powers legislated by the civil government for the purpose. The AFSPA was brought into being to cope with military insurgencies in J&K and the North-East. If the AFSPA is lifted then military deployments to fight insurgency operations in these states would be redundant.

From recent happenings in Manipur it would appear that the AFSPA, as it exists may not be a fool proof instrument resulting in avoidable excesses. If that be so, then there is a need review the AFSPA and incorporate suitable changes that would ensure that it cannot be misused and yet continue to allow military and paramilitary forces to be used effectively to curb the insurgency in the State. The Government's direction to review the instruments of the AFSPA is a step in the right direction. It would be counter productive to withdraw the Act before completion of the review process.

Question - 8 - In a massive military campaign against Anti-indian rebels the Royal Bhutan Army was successful in eradicating terrorist bases of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtipur Liberation Organisation (KLO). How important do you think is the cooperation of neighboring countries in checking terrorism in the northeastern states?

I do not go along with the conclusion referred to in your question that "the Royal Bhutan [RBA] Army was successful in eradicating terrorist bases of the ULFA, NDDB and KLO." The RBA has destroyed some critical caches and made some safe havens inaccessible to the militants of Assam. What has been achieved is to have increased the degree of difficulty for those militant groups to operate at will from Bhutanese soil against the Indian security forces operating on the other side of the international border.

This has facilitated the operations of the Indian security forces by reducing the space for maneouvre that free access to safe havens in Bhutan give to the insurgent groups. The RBA offensive has paid dividends by forcing militant groups to operate on territories where Indian forces can unleash their full potential. The same would be applicable for the ongoing operations being conducted by the Burmese Military against rebels operating against India from Burma, and if Bangladesh were to participate in this strategy. With any one of the neighbouring states holding out - militants will naturally gravitate to safe havens on the soil of the 'hold out' state. For India it is exceedingly important for all neighbouring states to come on board this strategy. Equally so for those states as the likelihood of the cancer taking root on their soil needs to be pre-empted.

Question - 5 - The nuclear ambitions of India and Pakistan are looked upon as a threat on the stability of the Southeast Asia". Sir you have done extensive research on Nuclear related subjects. Please comment on this statement?

Other than some lukewarm comments, South East Asian countries have not really shown any overwhelming concern about India having gone overtly nuclear. On the contrary there continues to be a positive response to the diplomatic and economic process of engagement that preceded the nuclear tests of 1998. If anything this process has gained considerable momentum since, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh's recent interaction at the ASEAN meeting.

Nonetheless South East Asia is concerned about the continued presence of nuclear weapons in spite of their having joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. Nuclear weapons have a global reach and whether they are in South Asia or anywhere else in the world they pose a potential to effect the well being of all nations - directly or indirectly. The nuclear capabilities of the South Asian states are not a stand-alone threat to South East Asia.
What has changed, and surely must affect South East Asian threat perceptions, is the fact that India's nuclear capabilities impinge directly on China, which is the major economic and military regional player. Therefore attaining a nuclear weapon free world through disarmament, as mandated by Article VI of the NPT, gains even more urgency and South East Asian countries can be expected to push for a world-wide roll back of nuclear arsenals with renewed vigour.

The other issue of concern is the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology in South East and Eastern Asia. Proliferation, which has been facilitated by Pakistan in North Korea and the inclusion of Malaysian entities in the global proliferation network established by Pakistan. This has a direct bearing on perceptions and possible strategies of three other regional states - Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. This factor has further heightened regional concerns about the continued existence of nuclear weapons and propensities of states to hinge their national security strategies to acquiring and fielding nuclear weapon - especially, under conditions that facilitate clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, materials and equipment.

For its part, nuclear India needs to institute credible CBMs with the South Asian states to mitigate perceived threat levels till such time global nuclear disarmament can be brought into force - if at all.

Question - 7 - India's stand on Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty(CTBT) has been looked down upon by western countries. How will you justify India's stand on these crucial matters?

The objective of the Western countries in negotiating the NPT, the nuclear technology restrictive regimes and the CTBT was - and continues to be - the retention of exclusive military capabilities to nurture their own supremacy in the global community. In other words deny a potential to non-allied states while retaining the capabilities exclusively with themselves thereby giving them the means to control - through threat of use of force - other states. Essentially the concept allowed the Western States license to proliferate in the 'vertical plain', which they continue to do, while restricting the so-called nuclear weapon states from any 'horizontal proliferation'. These were highly discriminatory treaties that impinged on the sovereign rights of the non- nuclear weapon states.

In so far as the NPT is concerned, India was one of the co-sponsors in the hope of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. However, during the negotiating process it became apparent that the objectives of the Western states did not encompass a roll back of their nuclear arsenals and that China, that had recently administered a humiliating military defeat on India, was to be taken on board as a nuclear weapons state, convinced India that it should abstain from making any commitment on this discriminatory Treaty.

The CTBT was essentially a ploy by which the Western States were able to inveigle the non-nuclear weapon states into agreeing to an indefinite extension to the discriminatory NPT and additionally a means to specifically deny India the means to validate its nuclear weapons arsenal,. India had no choice but to block the Treaty at the CD.

The fact that India recognized the pitfalls and the adverse effects that these treaties would have on her long-term national interests, refused to acquiesce to these discriminatory regimes, which was - and continues to be - a threat to the survival of the nuclear nonproliferation in the form the West had designed it to be to serve their national interests.

It is to the Indian Government's credit that it recognized these dangerous diplomatic minefields and navigated through them successfully.

Since its inception, the Western States have willy-nilly violated all articles of the NPT with impunity while denying the non-nuclear weapon states their legitimate develop nuclear energy to support their national economies as agreed to under Article IV of the NPT. Similarly the US, the prime mover of the CTBT has refused to ratify that Treaty and has instead allocated funds to rejuvenate its capacities to carry out nuclear tests. While this vindicates India's position on refusing to be part of these treaties there is no need for it to justify its position. That question should be posed to the Western States and their allies for their blatant refusal to honour the commitments they undertook by being party to these treaties.

Question - 9 - How serious is the threat between India and Pakistan?
On surface the nuclear threat posed by Pakistan may appear to be a thorny but manageable problem. However, it is far more complex than is generally understood. The stand alone one on one nuclear equation in its current makeup, between Pakistan and India in terms of weapons capabilities suggests that each has in place an existential strategic deterrent that would under normal circumstances allow for a stable nuclear environment on the sub-continent. However, there are other indigenous and external factors that impinge on the perceived aggregate of existing strategic capabilities.

First, the nature of nuclear weapon strategies and doctrines take into account geo-strategic structuring of the two adversaries and their overall national power quotient suggesting resort to nuclear doctrines that offset disadvantages and optimize on advantages. Consequently the respective nuclear doctrines lack the compatibility that would ensure deterrence stability. Thereby generating volatility that engenders a likelihood of miscalculations that take the edge off the deterrence value of extant strategic capabilities. Under these circumstances India needs to take the threat of use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan seriously and develop means that would reduce the dangers of a miscalculation by either protagonist.

Second, the extreme disparity in the technological horizons, indigenous industrial capabilities and availability of resources to support development of strategic capabilities between India and Pakistan give scope for the former to autonomously extend its offensive and defensive strategic potential to levels that negate the limited advantage Pakistan may perceive from a nuclear 'war-fighting doctrine'. Needless to say that there are signs of such activities underway in India. Pakistan, on the other hand, is to a great extent dependent on clandestinely acquired technology and equipment to enhance its strategic potential beyond current status, and its indigenous industrial infrastructure has certain limitations that make it difficult to maintain existing strategic forces without external assistance. This appears to give rise to a sense of insecurity in Islamabad, which it hopes to negate by marshaling extra-regional support. Consequently the nuclear cards of the US and China manifest in the nuclear polemics of South Asia thus raising the ante beyond a bilateral equation.

Third, at this point of time the US has deployed major Air Force assets at Jacobabad and all forward military air bases in Pakistan to facilitate its war being waged against terrorism in Afghanistan. To support these facilities the Americans have created substantial logistic capabilities at Karachi to support its forces deployed in Pakistan. In doing so, besides having substantial military forces deployed around the limited territories of Pakistan it has de facto control over Pakistani air space. C-in-C US Central Command cannot afford to make such lavish deployments in an area that could, under certain circumstances, be affected by retaliatory nuclear strikes by India, without taking suitable measures to offset the possibility of a nuclear exchange in the region.

Irrespective of the disinformation being churned out by a myriad of Western sources on the 'nuclear flash point' in South Asia, the Pentagon, could be reasonably certain that India will not [and cannot] unleash a nuclear exchange unless a nuclear attack is launched against it - and, therefore the security of American military resources is predicated on ensuring that Pakistan cannot initiate a nuclear strike.

This being a critical factor in the American war against terrorism in the region, one can safely assume that the Pentagon has put into place mechanisms that would undermine any possibility of deployment of strategic forces in Pakistani territory thus reducing the risk of Islamabad using its nuclear forces. This strategy is being enhanced by diplomatic pressures on both Pakistan and India to resolve their differences so that the possibility of a break-out of open hostilities is marginalised, thereby precluding a war between the two. If and when American forces vacate their deployments in Pakistan, this situation could change drastically.

Fourth, and by no means the least, is Washington's conferring of MNNA status to Pakistan. The MNNA status when coupled with the US Counter Proliferation Policy radically changes the nature of the nuclear threat on the sub-continent. With the extension of the American nuclear umbrella to Pakistan the Indian Government would be constrained to make fundamental changes to its overall National Security Strategy. Which, besides a reconsideration of its strategic alignments, would dictate changes in its nuclear doctrine and nuclear strategy to cope with a situation wherein Pakistan decides to engineer a state of conflict while it feels secure under the American nuclear umbrella. Then the onus would lie with Washington and C-in-C Central Command to initiate its Counter Proliferation Strategy to destroy India's nuclear capabilities before they can be brought to bear. This brings about a radical change in the nuclear threat on the sub-continent.

In conclusion one would say that in such a strategically dynamic regional environment the management of strategic policies cannot be predicate to the immediate needs alone but have to be seen in the light of India's short, mid and long-term strategic imperatives and national interests.